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And what are we to say of the enthusiasm of post-
industrial companies for the cellphone which enables 
them to abolish the distinction between working hours 
and private life for their employees? 
Or the introduction in Britain not simply of 'part-
time' but of 'zero-hour' contracts, accompanied by the 
provision of a mobile phone. When the company needs 
you, it calls and you come running. - Paul Virilio.2 
It is at bottom false to say that living labour 
consumes capital; capital … consumes the living in the 
production process. 
The more production comes to rest on exchange value … 
the more important do the physical conditions of 
exchange -- the means of communication and transport -
- become for the costs of circulation. Capital by its 
nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the 
creation of the physical conditions of exchange -- of 
the means of communication and transport -- the 
annihilation of space by time -- becomes an 
extraordinary necessity for it. - Karl Marx.3 
 
In this article we present an alternative theoretical 
perspective on contemporary cultural, political and economic 
practices in advanced countries. Like other articles in this 
issue of parallax, our focus is on conceptualising the 
economies of excess. However, our ideas do not draw on the 
writings of Georges Bataille in The Accursed Share, but 
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principally on Virilio’s Speed & Politics: An Essay on 
Dromology and Marx’s Capital and the Grundrisse.4 Using a 
modest synthesis of tools provided by these theorists, we put 
forward a tentative conceptualisation of 'dromoeconomics', or, 
a political economy of speed. 
          It is important to note at the outset that our 
general argument concerning excess speed departs considerably 
from postmodern conceptions of political economy, as well as 
from traditional Marxist formulations.5 Instead, our synthesis 
arises from our individual contributions to the ideas of 
'hypermodernism' and 'hypercapitalism'.6 We argue that the two 
contradictory forces of warfare and international trade drive 
the necessity for a conceptualisation of dromoeconomics.  
          These apparently antithetical but actually 
interdependent logics identified by Virilio and Marx find 
their 'suspension' in an institutionalised form of irrational 
rationality, or what we call 'hypermodern managerialism'; an 
extended, 'evolved', or 'advanced' form of sociopathic 
managerialism. It is a rationalist, secular fundamentalism 
that now extends into almost every aspect of life. In short - 
and we take this to be self-evident - dromoeconomics has 
become necessary because warfare has become industrialised 
while trade has itself become outright war. Both are 
indistinguishable in their hypermodern managerialist emphasis 
on the need for a political economy of speed. 
          We begin by focusing on the work of Virilio and the 
idea of excess speed before considering its relationship to 
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complementary aspects of Marx's work on the scientific 
critique of political economy and our conception of 
dromoeconomics. The second and third sections concentrate on 
excess speed and overproduction from a hypermodern perspective 
before centring on human warfare as the basis of international 
trade, and the suspension of these antithetical forces. In the 
fourth section we focus our efforts on the concept of 
hypermodern managerialism and the need for speed, the 
(il)logic of which suspends the antithetical tensions between 
war and trade. This section shows how hypermodern 
managerialism is related not only to war but also to trade, 
excess speed, the annihilation of space by time and the 
contemporary conditions of human life. In the fifth section, 
before concluding our argument, we discuss some of the 
conceptual difficulties inherent in synthesising Virilio and 
Marx as well as in developing the concept of dromoeconomics. 
Dromoeconomics 
For a number of years now, Virilio has been advancing the idea 
of ‘dromology’, the study of the logic of speed. Virilio 
believes that the logic of ever-increasing acceleration lies 
at the heart of the political and economic organisation and 
transformation of the contemporary world. As he puts it: 
To me, this means that speed and riches are totally 
linked concepts. And that the history of the world is 
not only about the political economy of riches, that 
is, wealth, money, capital, but also about the 
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political economy of speed. If time is money, as 
they say, then speed is power.7 
Thus we see that Virilio equates money, power and speed, 
implicitly recognising that the circulation time of 
'ephemeral' capital (money, for example) can, at least 
theoretically, substitute for 'massive' wealth and the labour 
it commands.8 But it is not enough to say that we have defined 
excess speed in terms of dromology and that this, in turn, is 
linked to wealth and power. Rather, we need some way of being 
able to grasp the relationship between the political 
production of speed and the economic production of manifest 
wealth.   
          Clearly, in the current 'globalised' environment, 
speed, mobility and wealth are somehow linked. But how do we 
connect the circulation time of money with the speed of 
violence? Virilio answers by calling for the development of a 
political economy of speed in addition to a political economy 
of wealth. Indeed, for Virilio, the ‘physiocrats who provided 
the basic studies of political economy’ were doing the ‘same 
sort of work’ as himself. However, the difference is that his 
‘research examines the comparable power of speed and its 
influence on morals, on politics, strategies and so on’. 
Virilio continues:  
I'm a physiocrat of speed and not of wealth. So I'm 
working in the context of very old traditions and 
absolutely open situations. At present, we still don't 
know what a political economy of speed really means. 
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It’s research which still awaits subsequent 
realisation.9 
Despite apparently confounding the Physiocrats’ agrarian 
political economy with de Tracy’s school of ‘ideology’, 
Virilio's allusions to a research agenda featuring a political 
economy of speed provide us with food for thought.10  
          It would of course be possible to develop such a 
theoretical conception from an explicitly Marxian perspective. 
Yet we believe that an important aim of this article is to 
attempt a synthesis of Virilio's ideas on dromology with 
Marx's rather undeveloped yet scientific and critical 
conceptions of a political economy of capitalist production, 
circulation, space and time. 
          Beginning in earnest in 1867 with the publication of 
Capital, Marx developed his scientific critique of political 
economy when investigating the development of the industrial 
revolution. For Marx, the origins of capitalist wealth lie in 
the production of an economic surplus, an excess that is 
distributed unevenly in the context of international economic 
growth thus giving eventual rise to conflicts over ownership, 
prices, profits, wages and employment conditions on a global 
scale. 'Let me point out once and for all', Marx writes: 
that by classical political economy I mean all the 
economists who … have investigated the real internal 
framework … of bourgeois relations of production, as 
opposed to the vulgar economists who only flounder 
around within the apparent framework of those 
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relations  … systematising in a pedantic way, and 
proclaiming for everlasting truths, the banal and 
complacent notions held by the bourgeois agents of 
production about their own world, which is to them the 
best possible one.11 
In Marx's terms, classical political economy gave way to 
vulgar economics in the first half of the nineteenth century 
when the bourgeoisie became politically dominant. Armed with 
the often-contested authority to subject the growing 
industrial proletariat to its rule, bourgeois economists 
abandoned their previous scientific aims and offered the 
status quo as the model for all future developments in 
political economy. Marx's scientific critique of political 
economy is therefore a radical perspective on the question, 
definition and central characteristics of classical, 
conservative and 'neo-classical' economics.12  
          Of course, in the present period, the key question 
is: how do we synthesise Virilio's call for the development of 
a political economy of speed with Marx's scientific critique 
of the political economy of wealth? For us, Virilio and Marx 
provide the basic starting point for a novel conceptualisation 
of dromoeconomics, a new political economy of speed. 
Nonetheless, our inquiry diverges from both Virilio and Marx 
because it is a synthesis of the related influence of excess 
speed and its impact on war, on international trade and 
hypermodern managerialism. For, as Marx suggested:  
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Circulation proceeds in space and time … It is … an 
essential process of capital … The constant continuity 
of the process, the unobstructed and fluid transition 
of value from one form into the other, or from one 
phase of the process into the next, appears as a 
fundamental condition for production based on capital 
to a much greater degree than for all earlier forms of 
production.13 
Marx's incisive remarks on circulation, space and time 
conclude our initial discussion of dromoeconomics. However, it 
is important to stress that our attempt to synthesise 
Virilio's ideas on dromology and the political economy of 
speed with Marx's conception of a scientific critique of 
political economy is a radical perspective on the 
conceptualisation of dromoeconomics and the political economy 
of speed. We now turn to the second section, and to issues of 
excess speed and overproduction, to the issues of 
hypermodernism, war and trade. 
Excess Speed and Overproduction:  
Into the Hypercapitalist World of War and Trade 
As noted, the significance of our argument with regard to 
excess speed and overproduction is that it departs markedly 
from postmodern notions of political economy. Like postmodern 
political economists, we are of course centrally concerned 
with the 'difficult restructuring of corporations in a 
constantly changing cultural climate' but we disagree with 
postmodernists such as Sassower that this process 'defies the 
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classical categories of capitalism'.14 Equally 
importantly, we distance ourselves from conventional Marxist 
interpretations such as those of Mandel not because we want to 
eschew the idea of 'late capitalism' but because we are 
seeking a less determinist epistemology that is open to a 
rethinking of Marx's corpus.15 As a result, our own work rests 
on the ideas of hypermodernism and hypercapitalism, the latter 
of which is the most significant in the present context. 
Broadly, we define hypercapitalism as the system within which 
the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life 
-- forms of thought and language -- are formally subsumed 
under capital and become its most predominant commodities. The 
two most distinguishing differences between hypercapitalism 
and its previous forms is the speed at which processes of 
circulation and self-valorisation occur, and the ephemeral 
nature of hypercapitalist commodities associated with its 
speed-of-light infrastructure of communication technologies.16 
In what follows, then, we suggest that the twin antithetical 
impulses of war and trade power the compulsion for a 
contemporary conception of dromoeconomics.  
          As Virilio and Marx have both argued, all 
hypercapitalist trade presupposes the overproduction of 
something, an excess of speed or a particular commodity within 
a community, for instance. It also presupposes a perceived or 
potential need for something for which a particular person or 
community lacks the means to produce, and which another 
person, group, or community produces to excess. All human 
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activity produces something. And this something, and the 
activity that produces it, is the axiomatic basis of excess 
production. Excess production is a time-dependent process. 
Therefore dromoeconomics becomes an absolute imperative for 
systemic overproduction. This is because, as Virilio and Marx 
separately suggest, not only do the 'higher speeds belong to 
the upper reaches of society' and 'the slower to the bottom' 
but also, in a very real sense, 'the whole development of 
wealth rests on the creation of disposable time'.17 Speed, 
disposable time, surplus production, and a devotion to 
abstract wealth constitute one side of the two interdependent 
and contradictory extremes of the political economy of speed: 
trade and war. 
          However, one of the earliest forms of socially 
institutionalised excess is well evidenced by the works of 
Virilio and Marx with regard to the wars of antiquity, to the 
maintenance and, crucially, to the movement of standing 
armies.18 Considered historically, war is for Virilio a 'method 
of total control over a territory and of a population'.19 War 
is thus a matter of necessity in settled societies. Indeed, 
according to Marx, throughout the history of human settlement, 
war has been: 
the great comprehensive task, the great communal 
labour which is required either to occupy the 
objective conditions of being there alive, or to 
protect and perpetuate the occupation. Hence the 
commune consisting of families [is] initially 
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organized in a warlike way – as a system of war 
and army, and this is one of the conditions of its 
being there [in a particular place] as proprietor.20 
To some extent, then, it is possible to speculate that 
professional warfare - mercenary warfare - is one of the 
earliest institutions of overproduction. It is therefore 
feasible to argue that it is the institution upon which all 
established systems of excess production, agrarian and 
industrial are founded.21 For us, therefore, the logics of war 
and trade are, at their roots, historically inseparable.  
          It has long been recognised that, while trade is 
dependent on the overproduction of speed, capitalism is also 
based on systemic economic excess. Indeed, the systematic and 
conscious production of massive excess which, according to 
Virilio and Marx, is founded firstly on 'the increasing speed 
of information transmission' and secondly on production 'for 
export, for the external market’.22 Thus capitalism, by 
definition, and at its very foundation, has its historical 
roots in warfare and international trade. And since excess 
production implies an emphasis on creating excess time, 
relatively speaking, economic growth in contemporary 
capitalism appears to be reliant on the production of faster 
processes of production. Nowhere in known history has this 
been achieved more intensively than in the world wars of the 
twentieth century. 
          Herein lies a central paradox, which is expressed by 
the very nature of what is called, rather mystically by 
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postmodern political economists, 'globalisation'. 
International trade and its imperatives for ever-accelerating 
productive activities is the organising logic of the 
'globalised' society’s tempo. That is to say, the social 
organisation of overproduction demands, whether positively or 
negatively, ever-more 'efficient' use of fractured, punctuated 
and rigidly organised social time – seconds, hours, days, 
months and years – each of which has its socially significant 
meaning in relation to excess production. But postmodern 
globalisation cannot simply refer to the restructuring of 
corporations, since it apparently requires increasingly 
massive militaries to maintain its trajectory. This is no less 
true even if we accept the current reduction of nuclear 
arsenals by the superpowers and the recent reappearance of 
tribal, ethnic and religious militias and paramilitaries 
around the world. For there is a paradox at the heart of these 
two co-existent systems, war and trade. It is this: whereas 
globalisation is said by postmodern political economists to be 
dependent on, and to produce, increasing amounts of inter-
national ‘harmony’ and depends, by definition, on the 
expansion and integration of national economies, the 
increasingly complex and expensive system of warfare 
presupposes increasing amounts of inter- and intra-national 
conflict.23 War therefore appears as an antithetical force to 
that of international trade. But that is not the case. They 
are complementary systems. 
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          This, then, is what we mean by the 
hypercapitalist world of war and trade. Today, both systems 
command, control, solicit, and deploy highly sophisticated 
information technologies, including, and especially, 
communication technologies. Both are concerned with control of 
space and time, and the production and consumption of people. 
Both are ultimately concerned with increased efficiences of 
time, acceleration, increased rates of increasing speed.24 Both 
are intra- and inter-national systems. And, despite their 
apparently antithetical natures, they are in fact unitary and 
unifying aspects of the same hypercapitalist system.  
          Any political economy of speed will, by necessity, 
be two-sided. As Virilio has suggested, war is 'the art of 
embellishing death' while Marx has noted the excess production 
of death and the excess production of the means of 
destruction.25 On the other, we have the production of excess 
time - surplus troops and surplus labour, surplus people - and 
the excess production of the means of excess production. 
Combined with social and religious reasons, these both 
seemingly rely upon and solicit increases in the velocity of 
technology, violence and population growth. In trade, 
acceleration is sought to reduce production, consumption and 
circulation time; in warfare, to reduce destruction time. 
Suspension 
These outwardly contradictory yet truly interlocking 
developments discovered through focusing on the work of 
Virilio and Marx attain their suspension in a gruesome, 
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'pragmatic', and programmatic synthesis that feeds on 
the antithetical relationship that unites them. The economies 
of excess speed and power depend upon surplus time, surplus 
value and thus surplus labour being available. What, for 
example, asks Virilio, is to become of the surplus 'people 
whose lives are being destroyed' by the technological 
revolution currently bringing about the 'end of salaried 
work'?26 Marx answers that such revolutions translate – 
precisely – into a demand for more people:  
what is required for all forms of surplus labour is 
growth of population; of the labouring population for 
the first form (absolute surplus labour); of 
population generally for the second (relative surplus 
labour).27  
Speeding technological development and growing wealth require 
increases in surplus time; surplus time requires surplus 
labour; surplus labour means surplus human activity, surplus 
human life. This last is manifest in the explosion of global 
populations during the last century.28  
          Meanwhile, as Virilio maintains, the fastest growing 
part of the global economy’s 'consumer goods' sector is 
armaments. Indeed, for him, the recent war in Kosovo not only 
'gave fresh impetus' to the military-industrial complex but 
also to the development of a new 'military-scientific 
complex'. As Virilio suggests, we 'can see this in China … 
[and] in Russia with its development of stealth planes and 
other very sophisticated military machines'.29 Or, as Marx puts 
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it, in mechanised, dromoeconomic hypercapitalism, 
'[i]nvention becomes a business, and the application of 
science to direct production itself becomes a prospect which 
determines and solicits it'.30 Simultaneously, according to the 
United States (US) Census Bureau, the global population 
continues to mushroom at the rate of about 80 million people 
per year.31 Human life - 'the labour market' – along with its 
means of destruction remains, quite clearly, the real 'growth' 
areas at the beginning of the 21st century. Each, it seems, 
provides the rationale and impetus for the other. 
Hypermodern Managerialism: The Need for Speed  
We call the programme that actively suspends the central 
dromoeconomic paradox hypermodern managerialism, the 
irrational 'rationality' of trade and warfare management, both 
of which have fallen progressively under the same logic since 
Fredrick W. Taylor’s 'industrial soldiering' became sine qua 
non in industrialised nations.32 Hypermodern managerialism has 
its secular faith in 'the reality of numbers'. It is a 
religion presided over by high priests of technical 
abstraction. Its most vicious phase begins in 1961, with the 
intensification of managerialist values in the defence 
department of the US.  
          That intensification was personified -- though not 
invented -- by Robert McNamara -- the then US Secretary of 
Defence and former president of the Ford Motor Company.33 Armed 
with the rational, militaristic, 'Management By Objectives' 
(MBO) system, McNamara mounted an assault on the defence 
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industries’ economic inefficiencies.34 From that point 
onwards, global warfare came to be seen in the US as ‘a 
rational business’, no different from any other.35 War and 
trade once again fell (officially) under the same system of 
management for the first time since the liberal overthrow of 
mercantilism. 
          McNamara decided that from a business perspective 
the Cold War had been run very inefficiently.36 To solve this, 
he ‘concluded that it would be rational to limit armament 
costs by producing larger runs of each weapon and selling the 
surplus abroad’.37 This would have a number of desirable 
effects, improving the balance of trade for the US and making 
the production of arms much less expensive. It would also 
ensure ‘a unity of material’ amongst allies of the US 
throughout the West should they need to fight a war together.38 
VietNam, the first fully-fledged managerialist war in history, 
was an abject, destructive and miserable failure. It rang in 
the era of hypermodern managerialism. 
          Some insight into the militant, neo-mercantilist 
logic of our emergent global system can be seen in the 
attitudes expressed by Friedman:  
The hidden hand of the market will never work without 
a hidden fist – McDonald's cannot flourish without 
McDonnel Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the 
hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon 
Valley’s technologies is called the United States 
Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. 'Good ideas 
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and technologies need a strong power that promotes 
those ideas by example and protects those ideas by 
winning on the battlefield,' says the foreign policy 
historian Robert Kagan.39  
Here the dromoeconomic paradox becomes much more crytalline. 
As Virilio suggested above, the most excessive, massive and 
currently profitable sector of 'consumer goods' production is 
the armaments industry, an industry dependent on what Marx 
called the annihilation of space by time and, today, 
paradoxically, by distance.40 Capital, too, has precisely the 
same tendencies and dependencies.41 The productive excesses of 
capital, which presuppose ever-expanding populations and 
geographical markets, are led by economies of speed, or more 
specifically, by an industrialised human culling machine – the 
military-industrial complex – on the one hand, and by a system 
of parasitic and abstract speculation - the financial market – 
on the other.  
Even though it is the single largest sector in the 
'consumer goods' market, armaments constitutes a miniscule 
percentage of global trade once we include the currently 
unsustainable levels of speculation in financial abstractions. 
In 1995, the global economic trade in physical goods totalled 
$US 3.9 trillion per annum.42. Approximately one-third of this 
was arms sales. In the same year, $US1.7 trillion per day was 
traded in currency alone, 100 times the amount of actual goods 
and services traded. In 1999, the currency trade reached $US6 
trillion per day.43 The ‘parasitic’ trade in monetary illusions 
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has replaced production of the means of life as the 
focus for the 'new economy'.44 As Marx argued above, no longer 
does circulation in space and time play the role of a mere 
facilitator. Circulation has become an essential process of 
capital, an end in itself. 
The largest corporate mergers and takeovers in history 
have happened in the last two years. What Virilio calls 
'globalitarian' economic power is today centralised to a 
degree previously unknown in history, with over fifty percent 
of wealthiest economic entities being corporations, not 
countries. As Virilio notes: 
Now, through the single market, through globalisation, 
through the convergence of time towards a single time, 
a world time, a time which comes to dominate local 
time and the stuff of history, what emerges - through 
cyberspace, through the big telecommunications 
conglomerates is a new totalitarianism … and this is 
what I call globalitarianism. It is the 
totalitarianism of all totalities.45 
Meanwhile, the US multi billion-dollar war machine is 
presented as the primary producer of global peace. The overall 
result: the shrill calls for increased efficiencies of 
'friction-free' speed by irrational management become ever 
louder based on claims of success. Billions of dollars are 
made and lost in seconds in a form of trade, which is both 
illusory and inflationary.46 More people have been murdered in 
a violent manner since 1945, when world peace apparently broke 
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out, than in all the wars of the previous 100 years: 
over 75 million lives, most of these civilian, have been lost 
in the ongoing series of 'minor incursions'.47  
          Hypermodern trade and hypermodern wars are economies 
of excess speed, life and death; theirs is the logic of 
dromoeconomics. And all of this is joyously construed as being 
productive of wealth, or excess time. But the over-production 
of speed is the negation of time; it is the consumption and 
destruction of time rather than its emancipation. Conversely, 
the production of arms is the latent negation of human life, 
and thus of production itself. The paradox of Schumpterian 
'creative destruction', carried to its illogical extremes, is 
now juxtaposed to a vulgar Marxian impulse for a revolutionary 
and 'democratic' global economy. But, as Virilio suggests, the 
'speed of light does not merely transform the world. It 
becomes the world. Globalisation is the speed of light.48 
Murder at twice the speed of sound, beyond the horizon of 
murderers, is juxtaposed to and complemented by the global 
integration of the telecommunications media through which 
speed-of-light speculation in financial abstractions forms by 
far the largest and most 'productive' sector of the global 
economy. It would seem humanity has reached the apotheosis of 
an almost universal system of irrational rationality, the 
logic of hypermodern managerialism. 
Towards a Political Economy of Speed 
Although the focus of this article has centred on Virilio's 
excess speed, Marx's critique of political economy and the 
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concept of dromoeconomics, it is important to note that 
there remain at least three critical conceptual problems and 
interpretative questions that require resolution.  
          The first concerns the political economy of excess 
speed, or, rather, Virilio's obsessive conceptualisation of it 
in terms of war and dromology. As Brügger maintains, Virilio's 
formulation tends towards ‘one-dimensionality and totality’.49 
In short, according to Brügger, in Virilio's world, 
acceleration explains everything. Consequently, Virilio's 
analyses tend to overlook other forces at work that he 
professes to be interested in, namely, the economics of 
overproduction. Virilio's work is problematic because, 
although he is deeply concerned with the idea of a political 
economy of speed, in reality he merely focuses on war and the 
political logic of speed, leaving aside any meaningful 
explanation of international trade, its economic production 
and suspension. While it would be untrue to suggest that 
Virilio's analyses focus only on speed, it would be true to 
say that it is virtually impossible to develop a conception of 
hypermodern managerialism and the need for speed from his 
chosen stance: there is no method in Virilio's madness. That 
is why, in this article, we have focused our efforts on 
providing a Marxian method for a Virilio-inspired hypermodern 
dromoeconomics. 
          There are a number of conceptual advantages 
associated with synthesising Virilio and Marx with the aim of 
developing the idea of dromoeconomics. But there are also a 
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variety of drawbacks. For some, Marx's political 
economy veers towards an obsession with production, and what 
postmodern thinkers like Sassower consider to be his 
‘essentialist’ tendencies, especially in relation to his broad 
claims to, and belief in, truth, scientificity, and progress.50 
Nevertheless, in this context, the richness of Marx's 
standpoint on excess production stems from the fact that, 
unlike Virilio's conception of speed, he does not believe that 
production literally explains everything. In truth, Marx's 
writings are, in Kellner's conceptual terms, 
'multiperspectival' in scope.51 They seek to take account not 
only of political and economic forces, but also of war, speed, 
the globalisation of capital, the effects and functions of 
philosophy and metaphysics, and, indeed, of any number of 
other forces in human society. Marx's 'multiperspectivism' is 
thus to be welcomed because it is only from such a perspective 
that a dromoeconomics may actually be developed. Our argument 
is that a fusion of Virilio's analyses of speed with Marx's 
critique of political economy is the most fruitful way to 
develop a dromoeconomics. 
          The second set of problems concerns the use-value of 
an approach that centres its analysis on excess speed, 
overproduction, hypercapitalism, war and trade. Obviously, we 
believe that there is much to be gained from such an approach. 
Yet a common criticism of Virilio's writings is that they are 
not simply overburdened with newly minted neologisms, but that 
they also arrive unannounced and without any subsequent 
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definition or explanation. However, no such criticisms 
could be levelled at Marx's works in this regard. Indeed, his 
conceptual writings are known for their prolonged efforts of 
clarification and exegesis. Our vantagepoint is therefore 
founded on the belief that by fusing Virilio's anarchic and 
conceptual excesses with Marx's theoretical precision, a new 
kind of hypermodern political economy of speed can be forged.  
The recognition of hypermodern political economy also 
implies the acknowledgement of the significance of suspension, 
hypermodern managerialism and the need for speed. This leads 
to our third and most important set of problems and questions. 
For our study of hypermodern managerialism and militarism is 
not intended as an ‘objective’ description of the status quo, 
but as a new and hopefully significant critique of such 
developments. Indeed, we maintain that there is something 
fundamentally at fault in the present system of hypermodern 
managerialism and globalitarianism founded on the irrational 
promotion of war in terms of international trade and vice 
versa. Is there an alternative? We think there is. 
First, it is important while developing the idea of 
dromoeconomics to continue to question orthodox thinking about 
the role of speed in the economy. This is particularly the 
case with regard to the current mania for fast companies; 
unrelenting and unreasonable efficiency gains; hypermodern 
managerialism’s concerns with dromological resource allocation 
and optimisation; as well as the irrational conduct of trade 
and war at the international level.52 Second, it is important 
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to focus on a viewpoint that simultaneously encompasses 
new concerns posed by the globalisation of hypercapitalism, as 
well as those addressed by the traditions of classical 
political economy. Specifically, 'dromoeconomists' need not 
deny the orthodox insistence on the significance of 
international trade. However, we argue that such a focus is 
too one-dimensional to grasp the reality of contemporary 
global conditions. It is for this reason that we have decided 
to centre our conceptualisation on the neglected dimension of 
the political economy of speed. For what is required, above 
all, is recognition of the centrality of speed in contemporary 
societies. But such an acknowledgement must also be joined by 
the recognition that a focus on speed alone will not, in and 
of itself, suffice. It is imperative, therefore, to link the 
issue of speed to relationships of power, of exploitation, of 
coercion, of hierarchy, and to the accelerating 
characteristics of the work and market places in global 
capitalism.  
Conclusion 
Our tentative dromoeconomics is, to some degree, an 
acknowledgement that contemporary capitalist societies are 
'dromocratic' societies, societies constantly on the move and 
governed according to dominant perceptions about the political 
and economic logic that their trade and war technologies 
demand. They are societies that are truly dynamic. However, 
they are ones that remain not only in dangerous disequilibria, 
but also – apparently - in delirious ignorance of the damage 
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being wrought by their own systemic and turbulent 
logics. Moving towards a genuine understanding of 
dromoeconomics in contemporary society therefore entails a 
conception of the political economy of speed.  
          But it also entails the recognition that Virilio's 
emphasis on excess speed and Marx's analysis of overproduction 
present us with opportunities for thinking about hypermodern 
explanations of war and trade that differ significantly from 
those offered by either postmodern or traditional Marxian 
political economists.  
Our preliminary agenda for a political economy of speed 
centred on suspension is merely one aspect of dromoeconomics. 
It is by no means definitive or exhaustive. We simply hope to 
point towards what we think is an important and undertheorised 
aspect; hypermodern managerialism and the need for speed, and 
the expression of these in the logics of war and trade. Our 
emphasis on hypermodern managerialism is necessary because 
armed conflict is a constituent feature of industrialisation 
and international trade. Globalitarian economic power, 
hypermodern trade and hypermodern war are the foundations of 
the globalisation of dromoeconomics. Moving towards an 
understanding of dromoeconomics, despite its conceptual 
difficulties, is therefore no longer an option. It is a 
necessity. In conclusion, we believe that our conception of 
dromoeconomics is significant not because it is yet another 
neologism but because of the important question it raises, the 
question of the political economy of speed. 
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